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CHILDREN OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIONt
Kristine S. Knaplund*
More than three decades after the birth of the first child conceived through in vitro
fertilization, few states have comprehensive statutes to establish the parentage of
children born using assisted reproduction techniques (ART). While thousands of
such children are born each year courts struggle to apply outdated laws. For ex-
ample, does a statute terminating paternity for a man who donates sperm to a
married woman apply if the woman is unmarried? In 2008, the Uniform Probate
Code (UPC) added two much-needed sections on the complicated parentage and
inheritance issues that arise in the field of assisted reproduction. Yet it is unclear
whether states will enact these new UPC sections; few states have enacted compa-
rable provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA). The issues can be
controversial, particularly regarding children born years after an intended parent's
death, or when the discussion turns to enforcement of a contract for a gestational
carrier the preferred term for a surrogate mother
This Article explores the legal landscape for children conceived through assisted
insemination, in vitro fertilization, intracytoplasmic sperm injection, and other
techniques. The Article discusses the differences between the UPA and UPC sec-
tions that concern assisted reproduction. It examines the critical normative and
ethical questions answered by these statutes and analyzes the likelihood that states
will adopt either uniform act. The Article looks briefly at gestational carrier agree-
ments to consider whether and how they should be enforced. The Article concludes
by noting the need for legislation, the virtues of the UPC over the UPA, and the
hope that states will address all those who use ART including gay and lesbian
couples, and single parents.
INTRODUCTION
Louise Brown, the first child conceived through in vitro fertiliza-
tion, is about to celebrate her 34th birthday.' Today, thousands of
children are born each year using assisted reproduction techniques
such as assisted insemination, in vitro fertilization, donation of sperm
and ova (unfertilized eggs), and gestational carriers.! Despite the
t @ 2011 Kristine S. Knaplund. All rights reserved.
Professor of Law, Pepperdine School of Law. The Author wishes to thank the
American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, the Michigan journal of Law Reform and Clara
Presler, Professors Ronald Chester, Susan Gary and Lawrence Waggoner, and research li-
brarianjennifer Allison.
1. Fergus Walsh, 30th Birthday For First IVF Baby, BBC NEWS (July 14, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/health/7505635.stm.
2. "Gestational carrier" or "gestational mother" is the preferred term now, rather than
"surrogate" or "surrogate mother," for reasons explained in the Comments to the Uniform
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rapid increase in assisted reproduction over the past decades, few
states have comprehensive statutes to establish the parentage of
these children. As a result, courts struggle to apply outdated laws
and wrestle with questions such as whether a statute terminating
paternity for a man who donates sperm to a married woman ap-
plies if the recipient is unmarried. If the statute addresses
paternity for donated sperm when assisted insemination is used,
does it apply to in vitro fertilization as well?' Does the same statute
apply if ova are donated rather than sperm?6 The legal climate is
more uncertain if a gestational carrier is used. In addition to legal
wrangling over whether a contract with the carrier is enforceable
and under what terms, courts must grapple with statutes that, in
certain cases, allow a man to deny paternity but create an irrebut-
table presumption that the woman who gives birth is the mother.
In 2008, the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) added two new and
much-needed sections on the complicated parentage and inher-
itance issues that arise in the field of assisted reproduction.! The
sections, 2-120 and 2-121, fill previous gaps with five key provisions.
First, in contrast to existing legislation in many states, the statutes
address the donation of all reproductive material-sperm, ova, and
preembryos-and not simply sperm.! Second, the UPC sections
apply to all participants in assisted reproduction technologies-
married and unmarried, heterosexual and same-sex, partnered and
single'o-again in contrast to many state statutes." Third, the UPC
Parentage Act Article 8: the term "surrogate" is inaccurate, misleading, and potentially nega-
tive, while the term "gestational mother" is "both more accurate and more inclusive" because
it includes both a woman who performs the gestational function without a genetic tie to the
child, and a woman who is both the gestational and genetic mother of the child. UNsF. PAR-
ENTAGE ACT, Article 8 cmt. (2002), 9B U.L.A. 75 (Supp. 2011). For an explanation of the
terminology, see Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Considering Mom: Maternity and the Model Act Gov-
erning Assisted Reproductive Technology, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 601, 609-10
(2009).
3. See infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Michael, 636 N.YS.2d 608, 609 (Sur. Ct. 1996).
5. See In re Parentage of J.M.K & D.R.K, 155 Wash.2d 374, 392 (2005) (holding that,
because "the process of artificial insemination is completely different from the process [sic]
in vitro fertilization [IVF]," a Washington assisted insemination statute did not apply to chil-
dren conceived through IVF. The statute has since been amended.); Finley v. Astrue, 372
Ark. 103, 111 (2008) (asserting that assisted insemination and PVF are "two completely dif-
ferent procedures" and thus an Al statute does not apply to children conceived through IVF
using deceased husband's frozen sperm).
6. See, e.g., Dantzig v. Biron, No. 07-CA-1, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 180 (Jan. 18, 2008)
(dismissing a parentage action for failure to include a necessary party, the unnamed egg
donor).
7. See, e.g., Soos v. Superior Court, 182 Ariz. 470, 475 (1994);J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp.
2d 1268, 1280 (D. Utah 2003).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
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addresses assisted reproduction techniques, such as in vitro fertili-
zation, in addition to assisted insemination. Fourth, the UPC
addresses issues of maternity in cases such as the use of a gestation-
al carrier, or instances in which the birth mother has no genetic
connection to the child.'3 Finally, now that thousands of couples
are cryopreserving their preembryos for long periods of time, the
UPC covers instances in which the intended parents have divorced
or one parent has died before the preembryos are implanted. 4
Will states enact these new UPC sections? Earlier efforts to enact
uniform laws regarding the parentage of children of assisted re-
production have met with little success. Few states have enacted
comparable provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA),
which, in many ways, duplicate the parentage and inheritance pro-
visions of the UPC.'6 In several critical areas, however, the Uniform
Probate Code sections differ markedly from the Uniform Parent-
age Act: the UPC includes all those who use assisted reproduction
and enacts an overly broad presumption regarding the parentage
of children born years after an intended parent's death." These
differences between the UPC and UPA mean that the UPC is far
more controversial.
This Article begins by exploring the current legal landscape for
children of assisted reproduction-those who are not conceived
through sexual intercourse, but rather through assisted
insemination (Al),"' in vitro fertilization,20 intracytoplasmic sperm
11. See infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part II.A.3.
15. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
first drafted the Uniform Parentage Act in 1973 to address the parentage of nonmarital
children. In 2000 and 2002, NCCUSL amended the UPA to include children conceived
using assisted reproduction techniques. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Prefatory Note (2002),
9B U.L.A. 5 (Supp. 2011). For example, only Texas and Utah have adopted UPA Section
801(b) regarding parentage when a gestational carrier is used. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 160.754 (West 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 788-15-801 (LexisNexis 2008).
16. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Article 7 cmt. & Article 8 cmt. (2002), 9B U.L.A. 67, 74-75
(Supp. 2011).
17. See infra part II.
18. Cf infra part III.B passim.
19. Assisted insemination, also called artificial insemination or intrauterine insemina-
tion, involves inserting the sperm into the woman's cervix by means of a syringe or other
device. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2009 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 544 (2011) [hereinafter 2009 ART SUCCESs RATES], available at
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2009/PDF/ART 2009_Full.pdf.
20. In vitro fertilization requires collecting the sperm and the ova, and combining
them in the laboratory. Once the sperm has fertilized the egg, the resulting preembryo is
implanted in the woman. Id.
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injection, 2 and other laboratory techniques that handle the sperm,
egg, or both. Section II explores the provisions of, and discusses the
main differences between, the sections of the Uniform Parentage
Act and the Uniform Probate Code that concern assisted
reproduction. These sections are Articles 7 and 8 of the UPA, and
Sections 2-120 and 2-121 of the UPC. For children born without a
gestational carrier (a situation governed by Article 7 of the UPA
and Section 2-120 of the UPC), the two principal differences
concern establishing consent to assisted reproduction22  and
references to same-sex couples and single parents. In addition,
only the UPC mandates timetables for assisted reproduction after
an intended parent has died. For children born using a gestational
carrier (a situation governed by Uniform Parentage Act Article 8
and Uniform Probate Code Section 2-121), key distinctions include
the UPA's extensive court involvement in the gestational
agreement and the UPC's gender-neutral terms that allow
application to same-sex couples.
Section III analyzes the likelihood that states will adopt either
uniform act by examining critical normative and ethical questions
answered by these statutes. First, how should consent to ART be
established, especially consent to be a parent after death? Second,
if a decedent is found to be a parent of a child conceived years af-
ter his or her death, does this encourage the postmortem retrieval
of gametes (sperm and ova) without the decedent's consent?
Should single parents and same-sex couples be included in the
statutes, or should the statutes determine parentage only for chil-
dren of heterosexual couples? Finally, Section III looks briefly at
gestational carrier agreements to consider whether and how they
should be enforced. Section IV concludes the Article by noting the
21. Intracytoplasmic sperm injection, developed in the 1990s, involves inserting a sin-
gle sperm into an egg and then implanting the resulting preembryo. Id.
22. Requiring evidence of consent for assisted reproduction might strike some as odd.
For children conceived through coitus, consent to be a parent is not a consideration. Even if
the child was conceived under criminal or fraudulent circumstances (for example, a false
promise of infertility), the progenitors are still the parents of the resulting child. Seel. Glenn
Cohen, The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 1115, 1128 & nn.37-38 (2008).
In contrast, when a child is conceived using assisted reproduction, the public policy consid-
erations are quite different, and consent (or rather, intent to be the parent) needs to be
established. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704 cmt. (2002), 9B U.L.A. 69-70 (Supp. 2011) ("Con-
sent to Assisted Reproduction" requires consent by the woman and man who intend to be
the parents of a child born using ART to be in a record signed by the woman and the man).
In many instances involving assisted reproduction, the biological parent does not intend to
be the parent of the child. As Professor Schultz observed, "the choices generated by modern
reproductive technology have made personal intention a far more significant factor in pro-
creation and parenthood." Majorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity Far Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297, 300.
902 [VOL. 45:4
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need for legislation in the area of assisted reproduction, the virtues
of the UPC over the UPA, and the hope that state legislation will
address the needs of all those who use assisted reproduction.
I. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
Assisted reproduction techniques (ART) include a range of pro-
cedures that vary in complexity. All have one thing in common:
ART does not include reproduction through sexual intercourse. In
this Article, ART refers to procedures that enable human pregnan-
cy through the handling of sperm, eggs, or both, outside of the
human body. ART is often, but not exclusively,13 used to overcome
infertility. The simplest ART, and the first to be widely available, is
assisted (or artificial) insemination (AI), in which sperm is trans-
ferred to a woman's uterus or cervix with a syringe or similar
device. A medical professional is not necessary for Al." If the
sperm provider is married to the woman being inseminated, the
procedure is called AIH (assisted insemination by husband). If
the woman's male partner is sterile or has a low sperm count, or if
the woman has no male partner, then AID (assisted insemination
by donor) can be used.
23. For example, a fertile couple with a genetic history of Tay-Sachs disease (a disorder
that damages the brain and nerve cells) or cystic fibrosis (an inherited disease that causes
serious breathing problems and lung disorders) might use in vitro fertilization in order to
decide which preembryo to implant. Once the sperm and egg have successfully joined in a
petri dish, and the resulting preembryo has started dividing, one cell is removed from the
preembryo for preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). A preembryo that has the genetic
markers for Tay Sachs or cystic fibrosis is discarded, and a preembryo free of the markers is
implanted. In a 2006 survey conducted by the Genetics and Public Policy Center at Johns
Hopkins University, more controversial uses of PGD were also documented. For example,
the survey found that 42% of ART clinics provided PGD for non-medical sex selection (i.e.,
sex selection for family balancing, rather than to avoid a genetic disease caused by a muta-
tion on the X chromosome). Susannah Baruch, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Parental
Preferences: Beyond Deadly Disease, 8 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 245, 253 (2008). Some have
argued that parents have a duty to use PGD to select their children. See, e.g., Julian Savulescu
& Guy Kahane, The Moral Obligation to Create Children with the Best Chance of the Best Life, 23
BIOETHICS 274 (2009). The lack of regulation on the use of PGD has prompted calls for
oversight. See, e.g., Jaime King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preimplantation
Genetic Screening, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHics 283, 337 (2008) (proposing a new
regulatory body to oversee PGD, which the author calls "preimplantation genetic screen-
ing").
24. See INSEMINATION HELP, http://www.insemination-help.com (last visited Feb. 18,
2012) (explaining under the subtitle Instructions for Artificial Self Insemination how to insemi-
nate at home and offering kits for sale for self insemination).
25. Jhordan C. v. Mary K, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 535 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) ("Artificial
insemination is, as demonstrated here, a simple procedure easily performed by a woman in
her own home.").
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In vitro fertilization (IVF) is far more complicated, and always
requires medical involvement. In IVF, the sperm and the egg are
combined in the laboratory, often by intracytoplasmic sperm injec-
tion (ICSI) that injects a single sperm directly into the egg."' Once
the sperm has fertilized the egg and the egg has begun dividing, the
resulting preembryo is transferred from the lab to be implanted in
the birth mother. IVF can involve a couple's own gametic material,
or the sperm, egg, or. both can be donated.
The least frequently used ART," and arguably the most contro-
versial," involves a surrogate or gestational carrier. The term
26. 2009 ART SUCCESS RATES, supra note 19, at 544. The Report found that, nationally,
ICSI was used in 65% of the cycles of reporting clinics. Id. at 91. The percentage has increased
steadily since 1998, when ICSI was used in 40% of the cycles reported to the CDC. CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: NATIONAL
SUMMARY REPORT [hereinafter ART NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT], available at, http://
apps.nccd.cdc.gov/art/Apps/NationalSummaryReport.aspx (select year 1998 from the pull-
down menu).
27. The 2009 CDC report found that IVF was used in more than 99% of the cycles;
that percentage has been unchanged since 2001. ART NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT, supra
note 26. Other ART procedures are not frequently used, and thus will not be discussed in
this Article. Those include GIFT (gamete intrafallopian transfer), "removing eggs from the
woman's ovary, combining them with sperm, and using a laparoscope to place the unferti-
lized eggs and sperm into the woman's fallopian tube through small incisions in her
abdomen," and ZIFT (zygote intrafallopian transfer) in which a fertilized egg is surgically
implanted into a woman's fallopian tube. 2009 ART SUCCEss RATES, supra note 19, at 544,
545 (providing definitions of GIFT and ZIFT). From 2001 to the most recent CDC Report
on ART (2009), each CDC National Summary has found that GIFT and ZIFT were used less
than 1 percent of the time by reporting clinics. See ART NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT, supra
note 26.
28. One report estimates a total of 14,000 to 16,000 gestational carrier or surrogate
pregnancies through 2002. Deborah Morgenstern Katz, Womb for Rent, PARENTING MAGA-
ZINE, Dec./Jan. 2002 at 86, 88.
29. See, e.g., Anita Allen, The Black Surrogate Mother, 8 HARV. BLACKLETrER J. 17, 18
(1991) ("Affluent white women's infertility, sterility, preferences and power threaten to turn
poor Black women, already understood to be a servant class, into a 'surrogate class.'") (in-
ternal citation omitted). Allen calls for a per se ban on commercial surrogacy as "the
safest-the wisest-course" for Black women. Id. at 31. See also April L. Cherry, Nurturing in
the Service of White Culture: Racial Subordination, Gestational Surrogacy and the Ideology of Mother-
hood, 10 TEx.J. WOMEN & L. 83, 128 (2001) ("By asking who is the 'real' or natural or legal
mother in the gestational surrogacy cases, the courts mask the use of White power over the
maternity of Black women, further devaluing the affectional ties Black women have not only
with White children but with Black children as well."); Michelle Ford, Gestational Surrogacy is
Not Adultery: Fighting Against Religious Opposition to Procreate, 10 BARRY L. REV. 81, 97-100
(2008) (describing religious opposition to gestational surrogacy, and concerns for the eco-
nomic exploitation of poor women); Lisa C. Ikemoto, Destabilizing Thoughts on Surrogacy
Legislation, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 633, 641-45 (1994) (describing how "patriarchy, white suprem-
acy, heterosexism and class hierarchy" influence laws on reproduction, including surrogacy);
Kevin Tuininga, The Ethics of Surrogacy Contracts and Nebraska's Surrogacy Law, 41 CREIGHTON
L. REv. 185, 192-204 (2008) (addressing concerns of commodification, exploitation of
women, profiteering surrogacy agencies, class and race problems in surrogacy selection, and
issues of satisfaction and suitability of the intended parents); Katherine B. Lieber, Note,
Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist Critique of Surrogacy beAnswered?, 68 IND. L.J. 205, 211 (1992)
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"surrogate" will be used in this Article to refer to a woman who is
carrying her own genetic child but has agreed to relinquish the
child to the intended parents once the child is born. "Gestational
carrier" refers to a woman who, like the surrogate, has agreed to
relinquish the child, but unlike the surrogate, has no genetic con-
nection to the child."
Since 2002, the Centers for Disease Control & Prevention
(CDC) has found that less than 1 percent of the ART cycles each
year involve a gestational carrier. However, the CDC Reports in-
clude only ART in which the egg or the preembryo is handled
outside the body, and thus exclude all cases in which only Al is
used.3 Still, since In re Baby M,3 4 which held that the surrogate (the
genetic mother and birth mother) was the legal mother of a child
conceived through ART, traditional surrogacy is rarely used. In-
stead, the gestational carrier's eggs are not used, meaning that IVF is
necessary. The new UPC amendments, like UPA Articles 7 and 8,
encompass all the forms of ART described above.
II. THE NEW UPC AMENDMENTS CONTRASTED WITH
THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT
The two new UPC amendments on assisted reproduction apply
to an ART child for whom the birth mother is an intended parent
(asserting that while some feminists see surrogacy as a reproductive choice, "most feminist
writers see surrogacy as a form of slavery or prostitution").
30. North Dakota, by statute, differentiates between a gestational carrier (in which the
egg and sperm of the intended parents are implanted in a woman) and a surrogate. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-18-01 (2009). Surrogate contracts are void in North Dakota, § 14-18-05,
while gestational carrier contracts are enforceable, and a child born to a gestational carrier
is a child of the intended parents for all purposes, § 14-18-08.
31. The CDC reports the number of cycles that were started each year at an ART clin-
ic, not the number of people who were treated. A cycle begins when a woman takes
hormones "to stimulate egg production or starts ovarian monitoring with the intent of hav-
ing embryos transferred." CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2008 ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESs RATES 4 (2010) [hereinafter 2008 ART SUCCESS
RATES], available at http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2008/PDF/ART_-2008_Full.pdf.
32. ART NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 26.
33. The CDC ART Reports define ART as "[a]ll treatments or procedures that involve
surgically removing eggs from a woman's ovaries and combining the eggs with sperm to help
a woman become pregnant." 2009 ART SUCCESS RATES, supra note 26, at 537.
34. 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988).
35. Steven H. Snyder & Mary Patricia Byrn, The Use of Prebirth Parentage Orders in Surro-
gacy Proceedings, 39 FAM. L.Q. 633, 640 (Fall 2005). Accord UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Article 8
cmt. (2002), 9B U.L.A. 75 (Supp. 2011) (noting that using a gestational carrier who is also
the genetic mother "is now typically avoided by the majority of ART practitioners in order to
decrease the possibility that a genetic/gestational mother will be unwilling to relinquish her
child to unrelated intended parents").
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in Section 2-120, "Parent-Child Relationship: Child Conceived by
Assisted Reproduction Other than a Child Born to a Gestational
Carrier," and to an ART child for whom the birth mother is not the
intended parent in Section 2-121, "Parent-Child Relationship: Child
Born to a Gestational Carrier." Section 2-121 applies both when the
gestational carrier is the genetic parent of the child because her own
egg is used, and when a donated egg is used to conceive the child.
In the latter instance, the gestational carrier only has a biological
connection, not a genetic connection, to the child. The following
section first examines Section 2-120 through its effects on those
using their own gametes, those using donated gametes, and single
mothers conceiving and giving birth after the death of an intended
parent. The discussion then turns to Section 2-121 and the parent-
age issues that arise when a gestational carrier is the birth mother.
A. Section 2-120: Parent-Child Relationship: Child Conceived by Assisted
Reproduction Other Than a Child Born to a Gestational Carrier
UPC Section 2-120 applies when the birth mother intends to be
a legal parent of the child and no gestational carrier is used. Be-
cause ART can be used with or without donated gametes, and may
occur even after one of the intended parents has died, Section 2-
120 addresses three types of parentage issues: (1) parentage of an
ART child where the living intended parents are the genetic par-
ents, (2) parentage of an ART child conceived with donated
gametes, and (3) parentage of an ART child conceived after the
death of one intended parent.3 6
1. Parentage of an ART Child Where the Living Intended
Parents Are Also the Genetic Parents
The new UPC amendments clarify parentage in this least con-
troversial case in which a heterosexual couple uses its own gametes
37to produce a child the couple intends to raise. Here, genetic par-
36. If both intended parents have died, a gestational carrier is necessary and Section 2-
120 does not apply.
37. How often this scenario occurs is impossible to calculate from the CDC statistics.
CDC reporting requirements establish when donor eggs or preembryos are used in IVF, but
there is no comparable reporting requirement for when donor sperm is used. Additionally, if
a couple uses assisted insemination but not IVF, they are not included in the CDC report at
all. Most IVF cycles involve using the woman's own eggs: for example, in 2008 the CDC
found that 87.8 percent of all reported cycles used nondonor eggs, either fresh (70.7 per-
cent) or frozen (17.1 percent). See2008 ART SUCCESs RATES, supra note 31, at 16.
906 [VOL. 45:4
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entage coincides with intended parentage. Accordingly, the birth
mother is also the genetic mother. If the intended parents are a
married heterosexual couple, the UPC declares that the woman
who gives birth is the child's mother3 8 and her husband is the fa-
ther, unless the couple was divorced or the father withdrew his
consent to be a parent before the preembryo was implanted.40 Even
then, the UPC would presume his consent and deem him a legal
parent if he "functioned as a parent of the child no later than two
years after the child's birth."4 ' The UPC makes clear that a husband
who provides his sperm, or a wife who provides her eggs for 1VF, is
not a "third party donor."4 1
The UPC does not limit its coverage to married couples. The
amendments use gender-neutral terms to cover all those creating a
child through ART.3 Thus, for an unmarried couple using its own
sperm and eggs, in which the birth mother is the intended mother,
the UPC declares that a parent-child relationship exists between
the ART child and the birth mother. The male partner (there are
no donated gametes in this scenario, so her partner must be male)
is the other intended parent if he gave his written consent either
before or after the child was born, or if he functioned as a parent
no later than two years after the child's birth.4" As with married
couples, a man who has given his written consent is not the parent
if he withdraws that consent, in writing, before the gametes are
implanted.
In many ways, the UPC reaches the same conclusions as to par-
entage as the UPA, although it differs in its definition of implied
consent. The UPA requires either written consent to be a parent or
that "the woman and the man, during the first two years of the
child's life resided together in the same household with the child
and openly held out the child as their own."0 In contrast, the UPC
38. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(c) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 57 (Supp. 2011).
39. § 2-120(d), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 57 (Supp. 2011).
40. §§ 2-120(i) (divorce), 2-120(j)(withdrawal of consent), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58 (Supp.
2011). These two exceptions mirror UPA Section 706.
41. § 2-120(f) (2) (A), 8 U.LA. pt. I, at 58 (Supp. 2011).
42. § 2-120(a) (3), 8 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 57 (Supp. 2011).
43. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58 (Supp. 2011) (refer-
ring to an "individual other than the birth mother who consented to assisted reproduction
by the birth mother with intent to be treated as the other parent of the child.")
44. § 2-120(c), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 57 (Supp. 2011).
45. § 2-120(f) (1) (signed writing), 2-120(f) (2) (A) (functioned as a parent), 8 U.L.A. pt.
I, at 58 (Supp. 2011). Section 2 -120(g) places further requirements on an individual who
signed a record more than two years after the child's birth, in order for that individual or his
relatives to inherit from the child. See § 2-120(g), 8 U.L.A. p. 1, at 58 (Supp. 2011).
46. § 2-120(j), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58 (Supp. 2011).
47. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704 (2002), 9B U.L.A. 69 (Supp. 2011).
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requires that a person "functioned as a parent" no later than two
years after the child's birth.4 ' As Professor Gary has pointed out, the
differences in language may lead to inconsistent results: under the
UPC, a man may be declared a parent for inheritance purposes, but
would not be a parent for purposes of custody, visitation, and child
support under the UPA.
2. Donated Gametes
When couples use their own gametes, the UPC and the UPA
generally agree on the legal parents of an ART child. If the birth
mother is married, she and her husband will be the parents. If the
birth mother is unmarried, the UPC continues the work of the
UPA to establish parentage regardless of marital status, by provid-
ing ways in which courts can find the birth mother's partner to be a
parent of the child. The UPC departs from the UPA if the couple
or a single parent elects to use donated sperm, eggs, or preembry-
os. The UPC provides a much broader definition of a "donor" than
the original UPA, including all donated gametes and not just
sperm. The UPC also differs from the UPA in its use of gender-
neutral terms, determining parentage in cases of same-sex couples
and single parents.
The first version of the UPA, adopted in 1973, determined
paternity in a single scenario: sperm donated by a man for use by a
married woman who was not the donor's wife. If the sperm was
provided to a licensed physician, the donor was not the child's
father. The relevant section, UPA § 5(b), stated: "The donor of
semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby
conceived.",o Litigation arose when, for example, a man provided
the sperm directly to the woman rather than through a doctor, or if
48. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f) (2) (A (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58 (Supp. 2011).
49. Susan Gary, We Are Family: The Definition of Parent and Child for Succession Purposes, 34
ACTEC J. 171, 177 (2008); see also Lee-ford Tritt, Technical Correction or Tectonic Shtft: Compet-
ing Default Rule Theories Under the New Unform Probate Code, 61 ALA. L. REV. 273, 299 (2010).
50. UPA Section 5(b) is still in force in several states. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.824
(2000); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.061 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 2002).
51. See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
a man who provided his semen to a woman for assisted insemination was the child's legal
father because the procedure in the statute, to provide the semen to a physician, was not
followed); E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 20 A.3d 1171 (N.J. Super. Ch. 2011). Contra Ferguson v. McKi-
ernan, 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007) (in absence of statute, upholding an agreement between
known sperm donor and birth mother that sperm donor would not be liable for child sup-
port).
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the man's sperm was used by an unmarried woman." The 2002 UPA,
in contrast, simply stated, "A donor is not a parent of a child
conceived by means of assisted reproduction.""5 UPC Sections 2-120
and 2-121 track the 2002 UPA, providing that, "[a] parent-child
relationship does not exist between a child of assisted reproduction
and a third-party donor,""4 and thus change the definition of donor
from the 1973 UPA. UPC Section 2-120 defines a third-party donor
as "an individual who produces eggs or sperm used for assisted
reproduction, whether or not for consideration." The UPC clarifies
that its definition of "third-party donor" does not include
individuals who are married; that is, it would exclude a husband
who provides sperm to his wife and a wife who provides eggs for
her own use.' The more recent statutes have also eliminated the
requirement that the sperm be provided to a licensed physician."
The UPC's main departure from the UPA is in the UPC's gender-
neutral language for intended parents. UPC Section 2-120 allows
both partners in a same-sex couple to be a child's legal parents." In
contrast, the UPA operates on the assumption of a heterosexual
couple. UPA Section 703, for example, establishes paternity for an
ART child: "A man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted
reproduction by a woman as provided in Section 704 with the intent
to be the parent of her child, is a parent of the resulting child." 8
This differs from the language of UPC Section 2-120: "A parent-
child relationship exists between a child of assisted reproduction
and an individual other than the birth mother who consented to
assisted reproduction by the birth mother with intent to be treated
as the other parent of the child."'" Although both the UPA and the
UPC will recognize an unmarried man as the other parent of the
52. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Michael, 636 N.YS.2d 608, 609 (Sur. Ct. 1996) ("[W]here
a man donates his sperm to a medical facility to be used for the purpose of artificial insemi-
nation, and all parties agree from the outset that they are forever to remain anonymous
from each other, there is no reason why the forfeiture of the man's parental rights without
further notice should depend upon 'the luck of the draw' because his sperm was utilized to
impregnate a married woman instead of one who was not.").
53. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2002), 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001). See Mary Patricia Bryn,
From Right 7b Wrong: A Critique of the 2000 UPA, 16 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 163, 170 n.23 (2007)
("Article 7 clearly states that a donor is not a parent of a child conceived via ART.").
54. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(b) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 57 (Supp. 2011).
55. § 2-120(a)(3), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 57 (Supp. 2011).
56. Compare id., with UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (1973) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A.
408 (2001).
57. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58 (Supp. 2011).
58. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (emphasis added) (2002), 9B U.L.A. 69 (Supp. 2011).
59. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f) (emphasis added) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58
(Supp. 2011).
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child,0 only the UPC recognizes two women (the birth mother and
her partner) as a child's legal parents."6
3. Postmortem Conception
Postmortem conception, in which a preembryo is implanted in
either a birth mother or a gestational carrier after the death of an
intended parent, raises concerns regarding parentage and consent.
Whenever a child is conceived through ART, questions may arise as
to who intends to be the parent, but these issues are more complex
when an intended parent has died months or even years before
ART.
Both the UPC and the UPA address whether a decedent can be
named the parent of an ART child if the gametes have not been
implanted before the decedent's death . UPA Section 707 requires
an individual to consent in writing to the use of his or her gametes
to conceive a child after the individual has died. Written consent is
the only way under the UPA to confer legal parentage on a dece-
dent of a child conceived through postmortem conception. In
contrast, the UPC allows an individual to consent to be a parent of
a PMC child in a variety of ways: through written consent," by
proof that the decedent intended to function as a parent no later
than two years after the child's birth but was prevented from carry-
ing out that intent by death,"' or by clear and convincing evidence
of intent to be treated as a parent of a PMC child.6 6 The UPC cre-
ates a broad presumption of consent to be a parent of a PMC child
for a married person if two conditions are satisfied: (1) the dece-
dent's surviving spouse is the birth mother of the PMC child, and
(2) at the decedent's death no divorce proceedings were pending.
This presumption that the decedent has consented to be the legal
parent of a PMC child applies even in cases in which the dece-
dent's gametes were retrieved after his or her death, or the
decedent's gametes were not used at all to create the PMC child.
60. Id.; UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (2002), 9B U.L.A. 69 (Supp. 2011).
61. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58 (Supp. 2011).
62. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (2002), 9B U.L.A. 69 (Supp. 2011). The postmortem
conception (PMC) child thus differs from the traditional posthumous child, in which the
child is in utero at the time of the decedent's death.
63. Id.
64. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)(1) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58 (Supp. 2011).
65. § 2-120(f) (2) (B), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58 (Supp. 2011).
66. § 2-120(f) (2) (C), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58 (Supp. 2011).
67. § 2-120(h) (2), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58 (Supp. 2011); see also Kristine S. Knaplund, The
New Uniform Probate Code's Surprising Gender Inequities, 18 DUKEJ. GENDER L. & POt'Y 335, 344
(2011).
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The UPC also differs from the UPA in placing a time limit for
PMC, thus allowing probate to close." The UPC requires that the
PMC child must be in utero within 36 months of the decedent's
death, or born within 45 months of the decedent's death."9 The
time limits are designed to allow sufficient time for the surviving
partner to grieve while allowing administration of the decedent's
71
estate to proceed in a timely manner.
B. Section 2-121. Parent-Child Relationship:
Child Born to a Gestational Carrier
A second amendment to the UPC, Section 2-121, establishes
parentage of a child born pursuant to an agreement with a gesta-
tional carrier. In this instance, the birth mother does not intend to
be the legal mother of the child. Rather, she agrees in advance to
gestate and give birth to the child, and then surrender the child to
the intended parent(s). The new UPC, like the UPA, generally
provides that the gestational carrier (and her husband, if she is
married) is not a parent of the child and the intended parents are
the parents of the child. However, there are three important dif-
ferences between the UPC and UPA in the area of gestational
carriers: (1) the UPC uses gender-neutral language while the UPA
assumes the intended parents are a man and a woman; (2) the
UPC upholds the enforceability of the parentage agreement even if
the gestational carrier contract is otherwise unenforceable under
state law, while in contrast, the UPA requires judicial approval of
the agreement in a process akin to adoption; and (3) the UPC pro-
vides several ways to establish consent to be a parent of a PMC
child, while the UPA contemplates only written consent." These
three key differences between the UPC and the UPA will be ad-
dressed in turn.
68. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(k) (1) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58 (Supp. 2011).
69. The official comment explains why both time limits are included: If the PMC child
is conceived through IVF at a medical clinic, there usually are accurate records as to the
exact date that the child is in utero. If the date of successful implantation is lacking, the se-
cond alternative, birth within 45 months of decedent's death, can be used. § 2-120(k) cmt., 8
U.L.A. pt. I, at 62 (Supp. 2011).
70. Sheldon F. Kurtz & Lawrence W Waggoner, The UPC Addresses the Class-Gifl and In-
testacy Rights of Children of Assisted Reproduction Technologies, 35 ACTEC J. 30, 36 (2009).
71. The UPA also includes provisions restricting the terms of the contract that are ab-
sent from the UPC. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(f) (2002), 9B U.L.A. 76 (Supp.
2011): "A gestational agreement may not limit the right of the gestational mother to make
decisions to safeguard her health or that of the embryos or fetus."
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1. The UPC's Gender-Neutral Language
As with UPC Section 2-120, the new UPC section concerning a
child born to a gestational carrier does not assume that the in-
tended parents are male and female. The UPA contemplates a
heterosexual couple contracting with the prospective gestational
mother. In authorizing a court to approve the gestational carrier
agreement, the UPA requires, inter alia, that "[t] he man and wom-
an who are the intended parents must both be parties to the
gestational agreement."" As with UPC Section 2-120, UPC Section
2-121 does not use the language "man" and "woman" or even the
plural "parents."3 Thus, a same-sex couple, or an individual, could
contract with the gestational carrier under the UPC and be de-
clared the parent of the resulting child. In a UPA jurisdiction,
however, if a same-sex couple or individual entered into such an
agreement, a court would not validate the contract since it would
not comply with UPA Section 801 (b) . As a result, the gestational
carrier would be the child's mother pursuant to UPA Section 809.
2. Enforceability of Gestational Carrier Agreement
The second key difference between the UPC and the UPA is the
enforceability of a contract with the gestational carrier. The UPA is
designed to make certain agreements legally binding and enforce-
able if a court finds that the UPA's requirements have been met.
The UPA declares that a gestational agreement that is notjudicially
validated is not enforceableM although the individuals who in-
tended to be the parents of the resulting child are still liable for his
or her support.77 Thus those who wish to use a gestational carrier
72. § 801(b), 98 U.L.A. 76 (Supp. 2011).
73. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-121(d) (2011), 8 U.L.A. p. I, at 62-63 (Supp.
2011) ("In the absence of a court order under subsection (b), a parent-child relationship
exists between a gestational child and an intended parent who: (1) functioned as a parent of
the child no later than two years after the child's birth . . . ").
74. As explained in the official comment to UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801 (2002), 9B
U.L.A. 76 (Supp. 2011), "a valid gestational agreement requires that the man and woman
who are the intended parents, whether manied or unmarried, to [sic] be parties to the
gestational agreement."
75. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803 (2002), 9B U.L.A. 78 (Supp. 2011). The UPA con-
templates a home study of the intended parents (unless waived by the court); a showing that
the intended parents "meet the standards of suitability applicable to adoptive parents"; and
a showing that all parties entered the agreement voluntarily and understand its terms. Id.
The UPA also sets requirements regarding the payment of expenses and compensation to
the gestational carrier. Id.
76. § 809(a), 9B U.L.A. 369 (2001).
77. § 809(c), 9B U.L.A. 369 (2001).
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are funneled into a system that resembles the adoption process. If
they do not getjudicial validation of the agreement, either because
they did not seek it or it was denied, the contract is unenforceable.
The gestational carrier is deemed the child's legal mother because
she gave birth to the child.
UPC Section 2-121, on the other hand, does not require judicial
procedures to validate the contract. Indeed, it defines a gestational
agreement as "an enforceable or unenforceable agreement for as-
sisted reproduction.,"7 A parent-child relationship between the
intended parent and the child can be established by court order or
by the intended parent functioning as a parent of the child within
two years of the child's birth.o The gestational carrier does not have
a parent-child relationship unless one is established by court order
or she is the child's genetic mother and no other individual has a
parent-child relationship under the section.
3. Use of a Gestational Carrier After the
Death of an Intended Parent
The UPC and the UPA also differ when a gestational carrier
gives birth to a postmortem conception (PMC) child. As described
above, the UPC allows an individual to consent to parent a PMC
child in a variety of ways, while the UPA only recognizes written
consent to parent a child conceived after an individual's death.
The UPC provides several ways to establish a parent-child rela-
tionship between a child and "an individual whose sperm or eggs
were used after the individual's death .. . to conceive a child under
a gestational agreement entered into after the individual's death."82
UPC Section 2-121(e) provides that the individual's consent to be
treated as a parent of the child can be shown by:
(1) a record, signed by the individual that, considering all the
facts and circumstances, evidences the individual's intent; or
78. § 201(a) (1), 9B U.L.A. 20 (Supp. 2011).
79. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-121 (a) (1) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 62 (Supp. 2011).
80. § 2-121(d), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 62-63 (Supp. 2011).
81. § 2-121(c), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 62 (Supp. 2011). After the highly publicized case of In 7a
Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), in which a traditional surrogate (the genetic mother of the
child) was declared to be the child's legal mother, the practice has become widespread to en-
sure that the gestational carrier has no genetic tie to the child. One state, North Dakota,
requires that this be so in order for the agreement to be enforceable in that state. See supra
note 30.
82. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-121(e) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 63 (Supp. 2011).
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(2) other facts and circumstances establishing the individual's
intent by clear and convincing evidence.
UPC Section 2-121 raises a presumption of consent to a gesta-
tional agreement after a spouse's death if three requirements are
met. First, the decedent must have deposited his or her gametes
(sperm or ova) before death at a time when the decedent was mar-
ried to the intended second parent and no divorce proceedings
were pending; second, the decedent's gametes must be used to
conceive the child; and third, the decedent's surviving spouse must
function as a parent of the child within two years of the child's
birth.
III. WHICH STATUTE SHOULD STATES ADOPT TO REGULATE ART?
State legislators, in considering enactment of the 2008 UPC
amendments, must address three key policy and ethical issues.
First, how should consent to ART be established? Does the UPA
achieve greater accuracy in carrying out an individual's intent, or is
the UPC's more inclusive approach preferable? The issue of con-
sent is especially problematic if an intended parent has died before
the child is conceived, in turn raising issues of bodily integrity and
procreative liberty. Second, should the statutes include all those
who use ART, in particular, same-sex couples and single parents?
Third, do gestational agreements resemble an adoption, or a con-
tract between consenting adults? This section will examine these
questions by contrasting the UPC and the UPA with existing state
law.
83. Id.
84. § 2-121 (f), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 63 (Supp. 2011). Curiously, the UPC presumptions for
PMC children differ depending on whether the birth mother is the decedent's surviving
spouse or the birth mother is a gestational carrier. If the birth mother is the decedent's
surviving spouse, the UPC only requires that, at the time of the decedent's death, the dece-
dent was married with no divorce proceedings pending. There is no requirement that the
decedent's gametes be deposited before death, or that they even be used to conceive the
PMC child. § 2-120(h)(2), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 63 (Supp. 2011). The presumptions arising from
these two UPC sections have been criticized for requiring different based on the use or ab-
sence of a gestational carrier, and should be parallel. See Knaplund, supra note 67 at 349-50.
The authors of the UPC sections, Sheldon Kurtz and Lawrence Waggoner, agree with this
reform. See Lawrence Waggoner, Lewis M. Simes Professor of Law, University of Michigan
Law School, Remarks at the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Symposium: The
Uniform Probate Code and the Remaking of American Succession Law (Oct. 21, 2011);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 14.8 cmt. k (2011) (recommend-
ing the change).
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A. How Should Consent to ART Be Established?
If a married couple uses ART with its own gametes, one might
wonder if a statute is needed at all. As Professor Shapo observed
over twenty years ago, "A child conceived through AIH [assisted
insemination by husband] presents no issues of parenthood or in-
heritance because the child is biologically linked to both the
husband and the wife."'" The UPC adds a section to ensure that a
husband who provided sperm to his wife, the birth mother, to con-
ceive a child through assisted reproduction has a parent-child
relationship." Most states already have statutes that ensure this re-
sult. For example, California Family Code Section 7540, originally
enacted in 1872, states, "Except as provided in Section 7541 [use of
blood tests to determine paternity], the child of a wife cohabiting
with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively
,,87presumed to be a child of the marriage.
Issues of parentage are more complicated, however, when the
intended parents are not married to each other or when they use
donated gametes. A statute is always needed when donated gametes
are used."" Ideally, the statute resolves the parentage issues by
declaring that the donor is not the parent and establishing when a
person who is not genetically related to the child is the parent. Both
the 2002 UPA and the new UPC state that a person who donates his
sperm or her eggs for use in ART is not a parent." In contrast to
85. Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of Reproductive
Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1091, 1107 (1997). See also Susan Frelich Appleton, Presum-
ing Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV.
227, 229 (2006) ("When the mother's husband really is the genetic father of her child, the
presumption's operation seems unremarkable and generates virtually no controversy.").
86. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(d) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 57 (Supp. 2011). UPA
Section 703 would find that the husband is a parent if he provided sperm with the intent to
be the parent of her child. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (2002), 9B U.L.A. 69 (Supp. 2011).
Section 705(a) gives the husband whose sperm was used two years to show he did not con-
sent to the assisted reproduction either before or after the birth of the child. § 705(a), 9B
U.L.A. 71 (Supp. 2011).
87. Former CCP § 1826, as enacted 1872, currently CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West
1994).
88. See, e.g., Dantzig v. Biron, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 180 (Jan. 18, 2008), in which a
biological father sued a gestational carrier for paternity of a child conceived with the biolog-
ical father's sperm and an egg donated from an unnamed woman. The Ohio Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal of his complaint for failing to join the natural mother (the
egg donor) as a necessary party.
89. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(b) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 57 (Supp. 2011); UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2002), 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001). The Model Act Governing Assisted
Reproductive Technology, adopted by the American Bar Association Section on Family Law
in 2008, concurs: Section 602 provides that "[a] donor is not a parent of a child conceived
by means of assisted reproduction." MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 602
(2008).
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earlier legislation, both statutes cover all forms of assisted
reproduction," rather than just Al, and both cover all types of
donated genetic material-sperm, ova, and preembryos9'-rather
than only sperm.
Once the donor is removed from the equation as a potential
parent, the statutes then turn to the more difficult issue of who is
the parent, particularly in cases in which a potential parent has
neither a biological or genetic connection to the child. Both the
UPC and the UPA establish a parent-child relationship between the
child and the birth mother (who is not a gestational carrier), and
provide ways for the birth mother's partner to be a parent, either
through consent or through actions after the child's birth."
When both intended parents are alive, the UPA and the UPC
work well. Because the UPA does not require written consent,
someone who functioned as a parent within the child's first two
years of life is considered the child's parent. The UPC has a similar,
though not identical, provision. By not requiring written consent
in all cases, but instead allowing parentage to be established
through the actions of the persons involved in the child's life, both
statutes strike an appropriate balance between strict legal require-
ments and reality. The statutes differ, however, on the evidence
they require in order to establish consent when the child is con-
ceived after an individual's death, the focus of the following
section.
90. See UNIV. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(b) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 57 (Supp. 2011) ("A
parent-child relationship does not exist between a child of assisted reproduction and a third-
party donor."); accord UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2002), 9B U.L.A. 69 (Supp. 2011) ("A
donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction."); cf UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b) (1973) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 408 (2001) ("The donor of semen
to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination" is not the father of a child thereby
conceived).
91. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(8) (2002), 9B U.L.A. 12 (Supp. 2011) ("Donor
means an individual who produces eggs or sperm for assisted reproduction, whether or not
for consideration."); accord, UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(a)(3) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 57
(Supp. 2011). The UPA originally only covered sperm donors in UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
§ 5(b) (1973) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 408 (2001).
92. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58 (Supp. 2011) (re-
quiring written consent, or that the individual "functioned as a parent no later than two
years after the child's birth"); UNIV. PARENTAGE ACT § 704 (2002), 9B U.L.A. 69 (Supp.
2011) (requiring written consent or a finding that "the woman and man, during the first two
years of the child's life resided together in the same household with the child and openly
held out the child as their own").
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B. PMC Children: Should the Decedent Be Recognized As a Parent?
If So, How Should Consent to a PMC Child Be Established?
Both the UPC and the UPA allow a decedent to be declared the
parent of a child conceived years after the decedent's death. The
two statutes provide different mechanisms for determining parent-
age in this instance. The UPA requires an individual to state in
writing that he or she consents to be the legal parent of a child
conceived after that individual dies. The UPC provides two addi-
tional ways to declare a decedent a legal parent in the absence of
such written consent: by clear and convincing evidence of intent to
parent a child conceived after the person's death, and through a
presumption that arises if the decedent's surviving spouse has the
child within a short time after the decedent's death.95 A brief survey
of existing state laws and cases on parentage of postmortem chil-
dren demonstrates the need for legislation in this area, and the
wisdom of the UPC approach over the UPA in resolving the prob-
lem.
Four states, by statute or decision, have determined that a tradi-
tional posthumous child (born within nine months of a man's
death) can inherit, but a PMC child may not. Virginia law provides
that any child born more than ten months after the death of a par-
ent is not recognized as the child of that parent and cannot inherit
in intestacy or by will."6 Georgia amended its relevant statute in
2011 to preclude PMC children: the law provides that "[c]hildren
of the decedent who are born after the decedent's death are con-
sidered children in being at the decedent's death, provided they
were conceived prior to the decedent's death, were born within
ten months of the decedent's death, and survived 120 hours or
more after birth."97 Courts in two states without statutes address-
ing PMC children, New Hampshire and Arkansas, have held that,
under applicable state law, a PMC child cannot inherit from a de-
cedent." A fifth state, New York, allows a child born after the
93. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (2002), 9B U.L.A. 73 (Supp. 2011); UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-120(f) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 58 (Supp. 2011).
94. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (2002), 9B U.L.A. 73 (Supp. 2011).
95. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)(2), (h)(2) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58 (Supp.
2011).
96. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-164 (2010). The Fourth Circuit referred to the Virginia
statute to hold that a child born seven years after the genetic father's death was not eligible
to inherit as his child and thus was ineligible for Social Security survivor benefits. See Schafer
v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 2011).
97. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1 (2011).
98. Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849 (Ark. 2008); Khabbaz v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin.,
930 A.2d 1180 (N.H. 2007). For a discussion of these cases, see Kristine S. Knaplund, Legal
Issues of Maternity and Inheritance for the Biotech Child of the 21st Century, 43 REAL PROP. TR. &
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execution of a testator's last will to claim a share if the child has
been omitted from that will, but precludes a PMC child from mak-
ing such a claim by requiring that the child be "born during the
testator's lifetime or in gestation at the time of the testator's death
and born thereafter." In these jurisdictions, enactment of either
the UPA or the UPC would change existing law by allowing a PMC
child to establish that the decedent was his or her parent, thus en-
titling the child to inherit.
Fourteen states" have enacted legislation to recognize the par-
entage of PMC children. Most of these states have followed the
UPA model in requiring the decedent's written consent to the use
of gametes after death.'o Six states have enacted Section 707 of the
2000 UPA, which provides that a deceased spouse is not a parent of
a PMC child unless the spouse, while alive, consented in writing.'o'
Another three states have adopted a later version of the UPA that
applies to any individual, not only a spouse, who consents in writ-
ing to post-mortem conception."2
A few states have enacted a UPA-UPC hybrid model or have de-
signed a novel version to resolve the issue of parentage of PMC
children. For example, California and Louisiana require written
consent to be a parent of a PMC child (as in the UPA) and impose
EST. L.J. 393, 406-07 (2008). The Ninth Circuit, applying California law, has held that a
PMC child was not the child of the decedent and could not inherit via intestacy under state
law. Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102 (9th Cit. 2009). California has since enacted a statute
requiring written consent from the decedent and imposing time limits on when the PMC
child can be born in order for the child to inherit. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(a) (West2011).
99. These states are Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Louisi-
ana, Minnesota, North Dakota, New Mexico, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See
infra notes 100-105.
100. See, e.g, ALA. CODE § 26-17-707 (2010) (requiring that a spouse sign the record and
that the record be maintained by a licensed assisting physician); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-
707 (2010) (applying to any individual using assisted reproduction). The UPC as originally
revised in 2004 by Professor Ronald Chester would also have required the decedent's written
consent to be the parent of a PMC child. Ronald Chester, Posthumously Conceived Heirs Under
A Revised Uniform Probate Code, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 727, 729 (2004). Unlike the
UPC, Professor Chester's version further required that the child live 120 hours or more after
birth, that the decedent be the genetic parent of the child and have deposited the gametic
material under circumstances in which parental rights were not terminated (i.e., not a do-
nor), and that a complaint be filed in an appropriate court to determine the PMC child's
status before final distribution of the decedent's estate and within three years of the dece-
dent's death. Id.
101. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707 (2002), 9B U.L.A. 73 (Supp. 2011); ALA. CODE
§ 26-17-707 (2010) (requiring that a spouse sign the record and that the record be main-
tained by a licensed assisting physician); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 194-106(8) (2010); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-11A-707 (2011); TEx, FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (West 2010) (requiring that the
record be kept by a licensed physician); UTAH CODE ANN. § 781-15-707 (LexisNexis 2008);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.730 (West 2011).
102. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-707 (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-65 (2010);
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-907 (2010).
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a timetable within which the sperm or eggs must be used to con-
ceive a child (as in the UPC).0 s The most recent state to enact
legislation on this issue, Iowa, crafted requirements that include
written consent and a timetable.0 4 Florida law accepts only one
form of written consent to parent a PMC child: a will. Its statute
provides that "[a] child conceived from the eggs or sperm of a per-
son or persons who died before the transfer of their eggs, sperm,
or preembryos to a woman's body shall not be eligible for a claim
against the decedent's estate" unless the decedent's will provided
for the child.15
The UPC rejects the requirement of written consent as too nar-
row, and allows consent to be demonstrated in other ways. The
UPC is thus in accord with several court decisions that have strug-
gled with the issue of determining parentage of a PMC child in the
absence of express written consent. One of the first cases to con-
sider inheritance rights of a postmortem conception child,
Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security (decided in 2002), did
not require express written consent by the decedent." Instead, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court required proof that "the
decedent affirmatively consented to posthumous conception and
103. See CAL. PROB. CODE §249.5(a) (West 2011); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §9:391.1(A)
(2010).
104. The Iowa statute requires that the parents must have gone through a marriage
ceremony or common law marriage not thereafter dissolved, that the decedent is the child's
genetic parent, and the child is born within two years of the decedent's death. IOWA CODE
§ 252A.3 (2011). If these requirements are met, the PMC child can take in intestacy,
§ 633.220A, as a child omitted from the decedent's will, § 633.267, and as a child born after
the execution of a revocable inter vivos trust, § 633A.3016. The statute is not retroactive for
children conceived before the law's effective date. See Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 966
n.4 (8th Cir. 2011). For an analysis of the legal implications of the Beeler decision, see
Kristine S. Knaplund, Will the U.S. Supreme Court Resolve the Issue of "Who Is a Decedent's
Child?", ABA REAL PROPERTY, TRusTS AND ESTATES REPORT (Dec. 2011), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/rpte-e.reporthome/rpte
ereport december2011 .html.
105. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (West 2011). Absent that provision in a will, a PMC
child is ineligible to inherit via intestacy under Florida law and thus might not be entitled to
Social Security benefits as the decedent's child. Stephen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 386 F. Supp.
2d 1257, 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2005). Contra Capato v. Astrue, 631 F. 3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011), rea'd,
Astrue v. Capato, 565 U.S. _ (2012).
106. 760 N.E.2d 257, 270-71 (Mass. 2002). The first case to hold that a PMC child could
inherit in intestacy from a decedent did not consider the issue of the decedent's consent. In
Estate of Kolacy, the court held that "once we establish, as we have in this case, that a child is
indeed the offspring of a decedent, we should routinely grant that child the legal status of
being an heir of the decedent, unless doing so would unfairly intrude on the rights of other
persons or would cause serious problems in terms of the orderly administration of estates."
753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. 2000).
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to the support of any resulting child."' The court was silent on
how consent could be established.os
In Vernoff v. Astrue, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the holdings in
Woodward and a previous Ninth Circuit case, Gillett-Netting v. Barn-
hart,o' noting, "The courts' reliance on the decedent's consent to
the posthumous conception, as a basis for establishing natural
parenthood, was central to the holdings in both Gillett-Netting and
in Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security . . . .""o In the absence
of statutory guidance, the Ninth Circuit in Gillett-Netting considered
evidence such as Netting's oral statements that he wanted his wife
to use his sperm after his death to conceive a child, and thus held
that the decedent had consented to be a parent of a PMC child
without insisting on a written record, as required by the UPA.' In
Vernoff the Ninth Circuit held that consent to parent a PMC child
was lacking, as the sperm was obtained after the decedent's death
with no evidence of his consent.112
Requiring written consent most accurately ensures that a person
who participates in ART does so with the intent to be a parent.'1 3 At
the same time, it excludes many who did not commit their intent
to writing. As Professor Joslin argues, while "the parties should be
encouraged to enter into written consents ... a child should not
be denied financial and emotional protections just because the
adults failed to comply with some legal formality."" The couple in
Gillett-Netting illustrates this concern.'10 The husband Netting had
been diagnosed with cancer in December 1994 while he and his
wife, Gillett-Netting, were attempting to conceive."" He delayed
chemotherapy treatments that would render him sterile in order to
deposit his sperm for later use. He "confirmed that he wanted Gil-
lett-Netting to have their child after his death using his frozen
sperm," and died shortly thereafter in February 1995."' Under
many state statutes, without his written consent, the two children
born using his frozen sperm would not be his legal children and
thus would not be entitled to inherit in intestacy.
107. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 259.
108. Id. at 270-71.
109. 371 F3d 595 (9th Cir. 2004).
110. Vernoffv. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009).
111. See Gillett-Netting, 371 E3d at 595, 596.
112. See Vernoff 568 F.3d at 1104.
113. See, e.g., In re KM.H., 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007) (upholding a Kansas statute that
required a written agreement that a sperm donor would be a parent).
114. Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender and Assisted Reproductive
Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REv. 1177, 1226 (2010).
115. See Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 594-95.
116. Id.at594.
117. Id.
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The UPC would recognize Netting as the legal parent in the ab-
sence of a signed record if he "intended to be treated as a parent
of a posthumously conceived child if that intent is established by
clear and convincing evidence."" In Netting's case, depositing
sperm shortly before his death, and his statements to his wife and
others on using gametes after his death, evidence his intent."9 If
the UPC contained only these provisions, the statute would strike
an appropriate balance between protecting an individual's interest
in controlling his or her gametes after death and allowing parent-
age to be established through clear and convincing evidence in the
absence of written consent. The UPC does not stop at this point,
however: it includes an extraordinarily broad presumption of con-
sent for a married person if his or her spouse is the birth mother
within the time limits of the UPC.20 Unlike the comparable pre-
sumption for a married decedent when a gestational carrier is
used,1 2 ' the presumption in Section 2-120 does not require an indi-
vidual to deposit his or her gametes before death. A surviving
spouse could benefit from the presumption even if the gametes
were retrieved from the decedent after death and without his or
her consent. The burden would be on the opposing party to show
by clear and convincing evidence that consent to parent a PMC
child was absent. Thus, the UPC's presumption of consent for a
decedent who is married at the time of death allows for, and argu-
ably encourages, the postmortem retrieval of gametes from the
cadaver. The ethical implications of encouraging postmortem re-
trieval of sperm or ova constitute important policy considerations
in the decision whether to enact the UPC.
C. Encouraging Postmortem Retrieval of Gametes in
the Absence of Consent Is Unethical
The UPC amendments provide three ways for a decedent to be
declared the parent of a PMC child: through a signed record,
118. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f) (2) (C) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58 (Supp. 2011).
119. See Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 594-95.
120. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(h) (2) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58 (Supp. 2011)
("If the birth mother is a surviving spouse and at her deceased spouse's death no divorce
proceedings were then pending, then, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary, her deceased spouse is deemed to have satisfied subsection
(f) (2) (B) [requiring that the individual intended to function as a parent of the child no later
than two years after the child's birth but was prevented from carrying out that intent by
death, incapacity, or other circumstances] or (C) [intended to be treated as a parent of a
posthumously conceived child if that intent is established by clear and convincing evi-
dence].").
121. § 2-121(f), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58 (Supp. 2011).
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proof of intent to function as a parent, or proof of intent to be
treated as a parent. 2 2 The "intended to function as a parent" test
works well when an unmarried couple has started ART and the
woman is pregnant when her partner dies. A typical example is a
partner who has accompanied the woman to the clinic consistently
but has not executed written consent to be a parent. Under the
UPA, the partner would not be a parent of the child even if the
partner's gametes had been used, because the UPA requirements
of either written consent or "holding out the child as one's own"
have not been satisfied. The UPC's more onerous standard of
"clear and convincing evidence" for a PMC child further protects
the decedent while offering an opportunity to prove such consent
in the absence of a writing.
The application of the UPC amendments is problematic when a
decedent leaves a spouse who later becomes the birth mother of a
PMC child. In this case, as long as no divorce proceedings were
pending when the decedent died, the decedent is presumed to
have consented to be the parent of the PMC child in the absence
of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. This presump-
tion applies even if donated gametes, and not the decedent's
gametes, are used to conceive the child, or if the decedent's gam-
etes are harvested after death, a procedure medically possible for
both sperm and ova. Sperm can be harvested up to forty-eight
hours after brain death, but is generally retrieved within twenty-
four to thirty-six hours of death.'13 While it is theoretically possible
to retrieve ova after a woman's death, no successful attempt has yet
been documented in the United States.2 4
Encouraging the postmortem retrieval of gametes without the
deceased spouse's consent is unethical and may violate a right to
bodily integrity or procreative liberty. Even if no such rights exist,
the practice should be discouraged on public policy grounds.
In cases where the decedent expressed consent to postmortem
harvesting of gametes, no argument of a violation of bodily integri-
122. See § 2-120(f)(1)-(2), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 58 (Supp. 2011); see also discussion supra
notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
123. See NORMAN L. CANTOR, ArTER WE DIE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE HUMAN CA-
DAVER 20-21, 212 (2010). Ideally, sperm is retrieved as quickly as possible after death, since
sperm motility and viability begin to progressively decline within three hours of death. See
Jennifer Tash et al., Postmortem Sperm Retrieval: The Effect of Instituting Guidelines, 170J. UROL-
OGY 1922, 1923 (2003).
124. SeeJason D. Hans, Attitudes Toward Posthumous Harvesting and Repmduction, 32 DEATH
STUD. 837, 839 (2008) (stating that there are no published reports of postmortem retrieval of
ova); David M. Greer, et al., Case 21-2010: A Request for Retrieval of Oocytesfrom a 36-Year-Old Wom-
an with Anoxic Brain Injury, 363 NEW. ENG.J. MED. 276 (2010); Michael R. Soules, Commentary,
Posthumous Harvesting of Gametes: A Physician's Perspective, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 362, 365
(1999).
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ty arises.25 The situation is, in some ways, analogous to organ dona-
tion: if a person has signed valid directives indicating her wish that
her organs or tissue be used after her death, then no harm comes
to her by carrying out her wishes. If she hasn't stated any prefer-
ence as to organ donation, her family members might consent on
her behalf. Even though obtaining her organs for transplant is
highly invasive, hospitals routinely harvest such organs with only
the family's consent.12
Like organ donation, harvesting sperm or ova after death can
be highly intrusive. Doctors obtain sperm through electroejacula-
tion,"' or the surgical removal of the testes (orchiectomy).1"
Minimally invasive techniques are also used, such as vasal aspira-
tion, in which an incision is made in the vas deferens in order to
insert a catheter and obtain the sperm. Postmortem retrieval of
ova requires a surgeon to remove the ovaries in order to obtain
the ova.'se
While alive, a person has the right to refuse to donate her or-
gans or gametic material. The United States Supreme Court has
held that "[t]he integrity of an individual's person is a cherished
125. Such premortem authorization, however, "is not likely to occur." Tash et al., supra
note 123, at 1923.
126. Indeed, some hospitals will only proceed with the family's consent, despite the de-
cedent's directive. The 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) made clear that a
decedent's donation is valid and "does not require family concurrence," UNIF. ANATOMICAL
Giwr ACT § 2(h) (1987), while the 2006 UAGA states that "[t]he decedent's wish for or
against donation is not subject to change by others," id. UNIF. ANATOMICAL Girr ACT § 8(a)
(2006). Still, in practice, the hospital may refuse to proceed if the family objects. As the
Official Commentary to the 2006 revision of the UAGA noted,
While the 1987 [Uniform Anatomical Gift] Act provided that a donor's anatomical
gift was irrevocable (except by the donor), until quite recently it had been a common
practice for procurement organizations to seek affirmation of the gift from the do-
nor's family. This could result in ... a reversal of a donor's donating decision.
UNIF. ANATOMICAL Giwr ACT, Prefatory Note (2006).
127. See Townsend et al., Artificially Stimulated Ejaculation in the Brain-Dead Patient: A
Case Report, 47 J. UROLOGY 760 (1996). In electroejaculation, "a well-lubricated large rec-
tal probe with horizontal electrode plates is introduced gently into the rectal ampulla
.... Electrostimulation via rectal probe may then begin." Electroejaculation, CORNELL MED.
COLL. DEP'T OF UROLOGY, https://www.comellurology.com/clinical-conditions/male
-infertility/sperm-retrieval-techniques/electroejaculation/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
128. See Swinn et al., Retrieving Semen From a Dead Patient: Utilitarianism in the Absence of
Definitive Guidelines, 317 BMJ 1583 (1998). Orchiectomy is the surgical removal of one or
both testicles.
129. See Tash et al., supra note 123, at 1925.
130. Cf Lisa V. Brock & Anna C. Mastroianni, Sperm and Egg Retrieval for Posthumous Re-
production: Practical, Ethical and Legal Considerations, in OFFICE ANDROLOGY 267, 271 (2005).
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value of our society,""' thus limiting the Government's right, for
example, to force a person to submit to a blood test.12 Similarly,
the California Court of Appeal has upheld a person's right to sue
to remove a nasogastric tube inserted over her express instruc-
tions, even though such removal could result in her death.m1 3
Legislatures have allowed a dead person certain rights to protect
bodily integrity, such as laws that enforce a person's instructions on
disposition of his body after death, including donations of his or-
gans.'3m In other contexts, however, the right to control the
disposition of the body is a right given to the decedent's family, not
to the decedent herself. If a cadaver is mishandled, for example,
the family may sue for a taking of their property without due pro-
cess of law.3 5 Some courts have described a person's "right to be
buried,"'3" but even this right belongs to the family, not the dece-
dent: the courts discuss which living person determines where and
how the burial will take place. As the Supreme Court of Rhode Is-
land observed in a dispute between a widow and the decedent's
only child over removing of the decedent's body to another ceme-
tery:
Now, strictly speaking, according to the strict rules of the old
common law, a dead man cannot be said to have rights. Yet it
is common so to speak, and the very fact of the common use
of such language, and of its being used in such cases as we
have quoted, justifies us in speaking of it as a right in a certain
qualified sense, and a right that ought to be protected ....
And a sort of right of custody over, or interest in the dead
body, in the relatives of the deceased, is recognized in the
statutes of many of our states.'
131. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966); see also Sell v. U.S., 539 U.S. 166,
169 (2003)(regarding "whether the Constitution permits the Government to administer
antipsychotic drugs involuntarily to a mentally ill criminal defendant-in order to render
that defendant competent to stand trial for serious, but nonviolent crimes."
132. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772.
133. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1136 (1986).
134. See, e.g., UNIF. ANATOMICAL Giwr ACT § 8(a) (2006).
135. See, e.g., Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing how
the parents of deceased children whose corneas were removed by the coroner's office with-
out the parents' notice or consent brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
alleging "a taking of their [the parents'] property without due process of law"); accord Whaley
v. County of Tuscola, 58 E3d 1111 (6th Cir. 1995); Brotherton v, Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477
(6th Cir. 1991).
136. See, e.g., Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 238-39 (1872);
accord In rejohnson's Estate, 7 N.Y.S.2d 81, 84 (Sur. Ct. 1938).
137. Pierce, 10 R.I. at 239 (citations omitted).
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Overall, an assertion that a cadaver has a right to bodily integrity,
and thus a cause of action if his or her gametes are retrieved with-
out premortem consent, is tenuous at best. No court has found
such a right to survive one's death. By analogy to organ donation,
the decedent's family would likely be allowed to consent to retriev-
al, at least in cases in which the decedent had not affirmatively
denied consent. A more promising argument, and one that has
support from some scholars, is the proposition that a person has a
right to refuse to produce a child after his death. Even though the
degree of physical intrusiveness in the harvesting of gametes post-
mortem may be analogous to organ donations,' the two
procedures have very different outcomes.
A key difference between retrieving sperm and harvesting a liver
is that only in the first case will the sperm result in a child with the
decedent's DNA.' A second difference is that organs are trans-
planted to benefit a specific recipient 40 while postmortem sperm
retrieval does not.
Should written consent be required, as the UPA provides, to
protect some right of procreative liberty of the decedent? When
gametes are retrieved postmortem, uncertainty often arises regard-
ing whether the decedent consented to be a parent. Harm occurs
when one has not consented to be a parent. Some scholars advocate
for a constitutional right to avoid procreation."' Professor Cohen
has argued for the right not to be a genetic parent by examining the
type of harm that occurs when one has not consented. He notes that
"it is not merely the existence of someone who carries my genetic
code, but the attribution of parenthood, that is the harm."' If a liv-
ing person is considered a parent by society, by the child, or by the
person himself, that attribution can cause harm through damage to
the parent's reputation, economic consequences, and other harms.
138. The Sixth District Iowa court implied consent for postmortem sperm retrieval
from the fact that the decedent had consented to be an organ donor under Iowa's version of
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. See Bethany Spielman, Post Mortem Gamete Retrieval After
Christy, 5 ABA HEALTH ESOURCE 2 (2008), www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter
/publications/aba health_esource home/Volume5_02_spielman.html (citing In re Daniel
Thomas Christy, Case No. EQV068545 (Sept. 14, 2007)).
139. See Hans, supra note 124, at 841 ("Although some issues overlap, there is a clear
distinction between anatomical gifts that are life-sustaining and those that are life-
creating."); accord Brock & Mastroianni, supra note 130, at 274.
140. See Tash et al., supra note 123, at 1924. Of course, postmortem gamete retrieval can
result in a benefit to the resulting child, who otherwise would never have been born.
141. See Russell Korobkin, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Nontherapeutic Biomedical Re-
search, 54 UCLA L. REv. 605, 626 (2007). But see I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the
Rights Not To Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1135, 1195 (2008) (challenging such a constitutional
right, at least as to genetic parentage).
142. Cohen, supra note 22 at 1137.
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If the parent is deceased, the decedent cannot feel any harm. Nev-
ertheless, the decedent's estate may be burdened by the decision
that he is the legal parent of the resulting child. While the dece-
dent will never pay child support, the decedent's estate may be
obligated to provide for that child as an intestate or pretermitted
heir.13 In fact, the harm to the decedent may be greater than to a
living person, because the decedent cannot avoid these claims
against his estate. In all but one state, if a parent were alive when
the unconsented-to legal parentage occurred, she could execute a
will intentionally omitting this child.' This option, of course, dies
with the decedent.
Aside from the arguable existence of a right to bodily integrity or
a right not to procreate that survives the individual, the policy mat-
ter remains: should a statute such as UPC Section 2-120 encourage
the retrieval of gametes from a cadaver without consent? The Eth-
ics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
issued a report on posthumous reproduction in 2004 that recom-
mended that "[a] spouse's request that sperm or ova be obtained
terminally or soon after death without the prior consent or known
wishes of the deceased spouse need not be honored,"4 5 but did not
ban the practice. Retrievals without consent have been reported.14 6
Even if a cadaver has no right to bodily integrity, the decedent's
body is entitled to dignity and respect,4 as evidenced by a wide
array of laws beyond those concerning procreation. For example,
laws prohibit necrophilia and the desecration of a corpse, not be-
143. Cf id. at 1127 ("The harm posed by unconsented-to legal parenthood is also fairly
tangible: it consists of the obligation to pay support for the child as well as any other obliga-
tions of a legal parent.").
144. The exception is Louisiana, which requires a parent to provide for a minor child
or a disabled adult child. See DUKEMINIER, SITKOFF & LINDGREN, W'ILLS, TRUSTS, AND Es-
TATEs 521 (8th ed. 2000) (citing LA. CONsT. art. 12, § 5; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1493).
145. Ethics Comm. Of the Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., Posthumous Reproduction, 82
FERTILITY & STERILITY 260, 261 (2004).
146. See Hans, supra note 124, at 838 (citing studies in which gametes were harvested
without consent of the donor for postmortem use). Also see Vernoffv. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102,
1105 (9th Cir. 2009), in which Bruce Vernoffs sperm was retrieved postmortem with "no
evidence to suggest that Bruce consented to the procedure or had ever contemplated hav-
ing a child postmortem." The Ninth Circuit held that Vernoff was not the legal parent of the
PMC child because California law considers the intent to create and willingness to support a
child in determining parentage. Id. at 1109-10. In Stephen v. Barnhart, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257,
1259 (M.D. Fl. 2005), also a case involving a postmortem conception child seeking Social
Security survivor benefits, the decedent's sperm was retrieved postmortem, but the record is
silent as to decedent's consent to the procedure.
147. See Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 790-92 (9th Cir. 2002) for a history
of common law interests in dead bodies.
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cause the cadaver has rights, but because of the message such acts
impart about our culture.14 8
Respecting a person's bodily integrity after her death can simi-
larly show respect for that person. Statutes allow a family to
consent to organ donation in the absence of the decedent's con-
sent while living because of the societal benefit to the living, and
because the decedent suffers no harm. Because the potential con-
sequences of gamete retrieval include parenthood, the decedent's
estate may suffer an economic harm, and thus the decedent's con-
sent to be a parent should always be required. As Professor Cantor
comments, "It is harmful to molest a cadaver in this way unless one
can reasonably infer that the decedent would have wanted his
sperm to be retrieved.""' To avoid encouraging postmortem re-
trieval without consent, the UPC should be amended so that the
presumption of consent to reproduce after death would arise only
if the decedent had deposited the gametes pre-mortem.
D. Should Statutes Include Unmarried Couples and Single Parents?
In order to be relevant to the population that is using ART, it is
critical to extend statutes to unmarried and single parents. A large
percentage of babies are born to unmarried women. Both the 2002
UPA and the 2008 UPC amendments determine parentage of a
child born to unwed parents,o but only the UPC includes same-sex
couples and single parents within its scope.'15
A 2007 survey by the Pew Research Center found that 37 percent
of births in the United States in 2005 were to unmarried women,
up from 5 percent in 1960.12 The 2009 CDC National Summary
reports that 95 percent of ART clinics offer their services to single
women.'" California Cryobank, the world's largest sperm bank, re-
ported in 2007 that over 30 percent of its clients were single
women. 5 4 Single women combined with lesbian couples totaled 60
148. See generally Tyler Trent Ochoa & Christine Newman Jones, Defiling the Dead: Necro-
philia and the Law, 18 WHITTIER L. REv. 539 (1997). The criminalization of necrophilia is
"based primarily on [our culture's] widespread horror at corpse desecration." Id. at 542-43.
149. CANTOR, supra note 123, at 222.
150. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
152. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, As MARRIAGE AND PARENTHOOD DRIFT APART, PUBLIC IS
CONCERNED ABOUT SOCIAL IMPACT 3 (Jul. 1, 2007), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org
/files/2007/07/Pew-Marriage-report-6-28-for-web-display.pdf.
153. ART NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 26.
154. Choosing Single Motherhood: Driving Trend in Out-Of Wedlock Births, CALIF. CRYOBANK
(July 6, 2007), http://www.cryobank.com/About-us/Press-Releases/template.cfm?id=1 266.
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percent of clients; only 40 percent were heterosexual couples.""
Ten years earlier, approximately 80 percent of the sperm bank's
clients were married couples."'6 Gay and lesbian couples are also
using ART to have children. 5 7 Including unmarried women and
same-sex couples in the statutory provisions is increasingly im-
portant to establishing parentage for thousands of children.
The UPC's inclusion of same-sex couples and single persons
could signal a change from existing state law and the UPA regarding
same-sex marriage and procreation. Professor Tritt has argued,
"Such recognition would manifest a drastic shift in policy in states
that do not allow gay marriage, civil unions, or second-parent
adoption."' 5' On family issues other than same-sex marriage or
ART, however, the UPC's gender-neutral language would be con-
sistent with many states' policies on adoption and foster care.
Almost all states allow single persons and people who are gay and
lesbian to be foster parents'59 and adopt,'" but a number of states
155. Id.
156. Id. For similar stories about single mothers and sperm donation, see Amy Harmon,
First Comes the Baby Carriage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005, at Gl; Lorie A. Patch, With No Mr
Right in Sight, Time for Plan B: More Women aye Silencing Their Biological Clocks via Sperm Dona-
tion, MsNBC.COM (July 14, 2005, 9:14 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8284173/ns
/health-pregnancy/t/no-mr-right-sight-time-plan-b/#.TOj4IszFSPQ. For cites to newspaper
accounts reporting that 1/3 of all AID consumers are unmarried women, see Judith F. Daar,
Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEYJ. GENDER L.
&JusT. 18, 25 (2008).
157. A 2002 report by the American Academy of Pediatrics estimated that "between I
and 9 million children in the United States have at least 1 parent who is lesbian or gay."
Ellen C. Perrin, et al., Technical Report: Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Parents,
109 PEDIATRICS 341, 341 (2002). While many of these children were conceived in hetero-
sexual relationships, some gay and lesbian couples are using ART to conceive children. For
examples of recent news reports on the "Gayby boom," see Cynthia Leonor Garza, "Gayby
Boom" in Houston: City a Favorite Spot for Gays and Lesbians to Raise Families, HOUSTON CHRONI-
CLE, Oct. 15, 2006, at Bl; Scott Harris, Gay Parents Give Birth to Families of Their Own, Thanks to
Such Methods as Artificial Insemination and Adoption, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1991, at Al; Kay Har-
vey, More Gay, Lesbian Couples Starting Families, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 4, 1999,
at B4, available at Factiva, Doc. No. tp000020010828dv4400heh; Dan Savage, Why We're Re-
turning This Summer to Gay Family Camp in Michigan, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 1, 2005, at Cl;
John Blake, "Gayby Boom": Children of Gay Couples Speak Out, CNN (June 24, 2009), http://
articles.cnn.com/2009-06-24/living/gayby-same-sex-couples-lesbian-parets? -s=PM:LIVING.
158. Lee-Ford Tritt, Technical Correction or Tectonic Shift: Competing Default Rule Theories
Under the New UPC, 61 ALA. L. REv. 273, 316 (2010).
159. But see Gary J. Gates, M.V. Lee Badgett, Jennifer Ehrle Macomber & Kate Cham-
bers, Adoption and Foster Care by Gay and Iesbian Parents in the United States, California Center
for Population Research, UCLA 3 (Dec. 2007), http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3484484b
(referencing UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4A-602 (LexisNexis 2008) (cohabitating couples who
are not married under Utah law cannot become foster parents or adopt) and explaining
that Nebraska may also prohibit gay people from fostering children, although currently the
enforcement policy is unclear).
160. Mississippi prohibits "adoption by couples of the same gender." See Miss. CODE
ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2011). Utah prohibits adoptions by "a person who is cohabiting in a rela-
tionship that is not a legally valid and binding marriage under the laws of this state." UTAH
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discourage the use of ART by anyone other than heterosexual mar-
ried couples. An Oklahoma statute authorizes only married
couples to use assisted insemination (Al)."'6 Many state statutes
clarify the parentage of ART children only in cases where the
child's parents are married.6 2 That leaves many ART children in
limbo, being raised by adults who function as their parents but are
not legally recognized. As ProfessorJoslin has observed:
Despite the fact that the evidence suggests that a significant
number of women making use of alternative insemination are
unmarried, only four states-Delaware, New Mexico, North
Dakota, and Wyoming-and the District of Columbia have
statutes that by their literal terms apply to children born to
unmarried couples .... In sum, children born to unmarried
couples through alternative insemination remain excluded
from the statutory and common law provisions in the vast ma-
jority of states."'
In addition to the Al statutes, some states have enacted laws de-
claring that only those gestational surrogacy contracts entered into
by married couples are enforceable. Florida, for example, provides
CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3)(b) (LexisNexis 2008). FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2006) states that a
homosexual is not eligible to adopt, but a Florida court has held that the ban violated the
equal protection clause of the Florida constitution. See Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v.
X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 81 (Fla. Ct. App. 2010). In 2008, Arkansas voters passed Initiative Act 1,
which prohibited unmarried cohabitants from being foster or adoptive parents, but the law
was held to violate the Arkansas constitution in Arkansas Dept. of Human Services v. Cole, 2011
Ark. 145 (Apr. 7, 2011). For a survey of state laws governing adoption, see National Center
for Lesbian Rights, Adoption by Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Parents: An Overview of Current Law,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, available at http://www.nclrights.org/site
/DocServer/adptn24.pdfdoclD=1221 (last visited Feb. 25, 2012); see also Am. Soc'y for
Reprod. Med., Access To Fertility Treatment by Gays, Lesbians and Unmarried Persons, 92 FERTILI-
Ty & STERILITY, 1190,1191 (2009).
161. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 553 (West 2011) (authorizing doctors to perform ar-
tificial insemination only with permission of husband and wife).
162. These include statutes modeled on the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act, which pro-
vided that a husband who consented to the artificial insemination of his wife was the father
of the resulting child, but were silent on parentage for unmarried couples, see, e.g., Mo. REV
STAT. § 210.824 (2000); NEV. REv. STAT. § 126.061 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West
2002), but even more recent statutes covering egg donation deal only with married couples,
e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 554 (2009) ("Any child or children born as a result of a heter-
ologous oocyte donation shall be considered for all legal intents and purposes, the same as a
naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband and wife which consent to and receive
an oocyte pursuant to the technique of heterologous oocyte donation."). For a discussion of
these statutes and their effects on single women, see Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children
from the Marriage Movement: The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and As-
sisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 305, 310-13 (2006).
163. Courney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender and Assisted Reproductive
Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REv. 1177, 1186-187 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
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that "[a] contract for gestational surrogacy shall not be binding
and enforceable unless . . . the commissioning couple are legally
married and are both 18 years of age or older."'" Texas and Utah
have similar laws authorizing gestational agreements on the condi-
tion, inter alia, that "[t]he intended parents must be married to
each other," 6 5 but neither state will recognize the marriage of two
men performed legally in another state.16 For such a married cou-
ple,' this refusal to allow the use of ART or to enforce their
gestational agreement could implicate a right to procreate sug-
gested by the United States Supreme Court's decisions in such
cases as Griswold v. Connecticut.w Using a gestational carrier is the
only means by which a gay couple can have a child. If the purpose
of marriage is to have and raise children, as some have argued in
the debate over same-sex marriage, 1 this provides a compelling
reason to include married gay couples in these statutes. A right to
procreate protects the creation of children, not the specific hetero-
sexual conduct that leads to them. As Professor Robertson has
argued, "beliefs about the importance of having offspring are so
important that coital reproduction by married couples is constitu-
tionally protected .... But if that point is so, then noncoital
164. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1) (2010). Six states have similar statutes: NEv. REV.
STAT. § 126.045 (2011); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:21 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-
801 (LexisNexis 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (2008).
165. TEX. FAM. CODE § 160.754(b) (West 2010); accori UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-
801(3).
166. TEX. FAM, CODE§ 160.754(b) (West2010); UTAH CONST. art 1, § 29.
167. Seven states issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples: Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire and New York, plus the District of Columbia. Defining Mar-
riage: Defense of Marriage Acts and SameSex Marriage Laws, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-overviewaspx (last
updated Feb. 24, 2012). Although California does not currently allow same-sex marriage, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the state constitution's restriction on same-sex
marriage was invalid. This decision will not take effect, however, until it is decided on ap-
peal. Id.
168. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (ban on sale of contraception to
married couple violated right of privacy).
169. See, e.g., Jeffery J. Ventrella, Square Circles?!! Restoring Rationality to the Same-Sex "Mar-
riage" Debate, 32 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 681, 702-06 (2005) (providing that "[c]ourts have
always recognized that the relationship between procreation and marriage is the reason for
State protection of the institution" and citing cases); Amy L. Wax, Op-Ed Promoting the Ideal of
Procreation, N.Y. TIstEs (Aug. 4, 2010, 11:45 PM), http://wwv.nytimes.com/roomfordebate
/2010/08/04/gay-marriage-and-the-constitution/promoting-the-ideal-of-procreation ("The
privileged place accorded marriage between a man and a woman represents the law's attempt
to recognize the unique value of the ideal family-mother, father, child-and to encourage its
formation."). But seeJohn Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 323, 342-45 (2004) (refuting such arguments); Am. Soc'y for Reprod.
Med., supra note 160, at 1190 ("Neither concerns about the welfare of children nor the desire
to promote marriage justify denying reproductive services to unmarried individuals or couples,
including those who are gay or lesbian.").
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reproduction should also be presumptively protected because it
involves conduct that arrives at the same results that coital repro-
duction does." 0 While Professor Robertson argues that only
married couples should have this right to procreate using ART, the
U.S. Supreme Court has not limited the right of privacy to married
couples, concluding that "it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision wheth-
er to bear or beget a child.""1 Unlike the statute in Eisenstadt v.
Baird, which criminalized providing contraceptives to unmarried
persons, most state statutes allow single, gay, and lesbian persons to
use ART to have children, but penalize them by failing to provide
the same clear rules for parentage as given to married couples.
These statutes should determine parentage for everyone using
ART, whether married or not. Some scholars have argued that stat-
utes that explicitly limit certain ARTs to married couples infringe
on the right of privacy of unmarried persons found in cases such as
Skinner' 2 and Eisenstadt."3 Professor Daar, for example, argues that
such statutes "pose an undue burden on the rights of unmarried
persons to procreate. "17 Laws that restrict ART to married cou-
ples '17 are reminiscent of old statutes that sought to discourage
out-of-wedlock children by refusing to allow these children to in-
herit. ' Centuries of discrimination against illegitimate children
were finally overcome with "a transformation of the law of illegiti-
macy in the United States [that] followed the world-wide pattern of
170. John A. Robertson, Liberalism and The Limits of Procreative Liberty: A Response To My
Critics, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 233, 246 (1995).
171. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (referring to the decision in Griswold
that struck down a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried couples); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
172. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The U.S. Supreme Court held that an Oklahoma statute that
required sterilization of repeat offenders who committed larceny, but not embezzlement,
violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment by forever depriving the con-
victed felon of "one of the basic civil rights of man." Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
173. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
174. Daar, supra note 156, at 52. Professor Daar goes on to conclude that "[s]tate laws
that deprive unmarried individuals of access to ART seem ripe for invalidation under the
Constitution on deprivation of liberty grounds." Id. at 54. Professor Robertson, by contrast,
notes that "the United States Supreme Court has never recognized a constitutional right to
conceive if unmarried" and concludes that the "nightmare vision that respect for procreative
liberty would protect the right of a single man or woman to orchestrate the conception,
gestation, and birth of a child for that person to rear or allocate to others to rear is simply
wrong." Robertson, supra note 170, at 239-40.
175. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.15(1) (2010) (declaring that only married couples can
create legally enforceable contracts for gestational surrogacy); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 553
(2011) (authorizing only married couples to use Al).
176. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). For a discussion of these policies, see Ap-
pleton, supra note 85, at 243-44.
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approximating the status of the child born outside marriage to that
of the child born within marriage."' 7 The UPC amendments on
assisted reproduction attempt to treat ART children on the same
basis as those conceived through coitus. Thus, it is critical to in-
clude all children of assisted reproduction in these statutes. The
attempt to decrease out-of-wedlock births by stigmatizing their off-
spring failed miserably; this same attempt with ART children is
likely to fail as well.
E. How Should Gestational Carrier Agreements Be Enforced?
Whether gestational carrier or surrogacy agreements should be
enforceable has been debated since a highly publicized Scotland
Yard investigation of a surrogate in England in 1985"' and the Baby
M case in the United States in 1986.179 Opponents of surrogacy and
gestational carrier agreements argue, for example, that the con-
tracts commodify women and children, that it is impossible to fairly
enforce an agreement on an experience such as pregnancy, and
that the arrangements prey on those with fewer resources and
standing in society.'8"
As with ART generally, most states do not have legislation or case
law that determines the enforceability of these agreements.8
Among the states willing to enforce gestational carrier agreements,
the procedures by which intended parents become legal parents
differ greatly. At one end of the spectrum, several states declare
that the intended parents are the legal parents of the child as soon
as the preembryo is implanted,' 2 or upon the child's birth.' At the
other end of the spectrum are states that require judicial involve-
177. Mary Ann Glendon, Marriage and the State: The WitheringAway Of Marriage, 62 VA. L.
REv. 663, 714 (1976).
178. January 4, 1985: Inquiry Over 'Baby-For-Cash' Deal BBC: ON THIs DAY, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/january/4/newsid_2495000/249585 7 .stm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2012).
179. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); see also Darra L. Hofman, 'Mama's Baby,
Daddy's Maybe': A Slate-By-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 449, 452 (2009); Carla Spivack, The Law of Surrogate Motherhood in the
United States, 58 AM.J. COMP. L. 97, 99 (2010) (discussing Baby M case).
180. See Hofman, supra note 179, at 452 for a summary of these and other arguments
against surrogacy.
181. Seeid.at454.
182. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-08 (2009).
183. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (2011) (although a court order is required to issue a
substituted birth certificate naming the intended mother, and not the gestational carrier, as
the mother); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20, 47/25 (2010) (other requirements include, inter
alia, proof of the medical need for a gestational carrier); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 126.045
(West 2011) (allowing only married heterosexual couples to be declared the legal parents).
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ment to establish parentage, either before ART begins5 4 or after
the child's birth." In states with no legislation or case law, the in-
186tended parents usually follow adoption procedures.
The question is whether all intended parents should go through
a judicial process akin to adoption, as the UPA requires, or wheth-
er the less onerous procedure of the UPC is better suited to
gestational carrier agreements." One disquieting result of the
UPA's judicial model is that, in many cases, it requires an intended
parent to adopt his or her own genetic child.'8" This occurs when
the gestational carrier uses the gametes of one or both intended
parents.'" In Arredondo v. Nodelman, for example, a married couple
using its sperm and egg contracted with a gestational carrier to
carry the child and relinquish the baby upon the birth to the in-
tended parents."" The intended, and also genetic, parents brought
184. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(A) (West
2011).
185. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.16 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801 (West 2011).
186. Hofman, supra note 179, at 466.
187. Another option is the middle ground provided by the ABA Family Law Section's
Model Act on Assisted Reproductive Techniques, which gives two alternatives: a judicial
preauthorization model, and an administrative model for a self-enforcing agreement pro-
vided all parties meet certain requirements (such as being represented by independent
counsel). See Christine Metteer Lorillard, Informed Choices and Uniform Decisions: Adopting the
ABA's Self-Enforcing Administrative Model to Ensure Successful Surrogacy Arrangements, 16
CARDOZOJ.L. & GENDER 237, 240-41 (2010).
188. See Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should not have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage
Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the 21st Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201 (2009).
189. Utah requires one of the intended parents to be a genetic parent in order for the
agreement to be enforceable against the gestational carrier. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-
801 to -809 (LexisNexis 2008). Both proposed alternatives of the ABA Family Law Section's
Model Act on Assisted Reproductive Techniques require one intended parent to be a genet-
ic parent. SeeSpivack, supra note 179, at 111.
190. Arredondo v. Nodelman, 622 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1994); accord Johnson v.
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (husband's sperm and wife's egg were used to conceive
child and implanted in gestational carrier; court held that where genetics and birth do not
coincide, the intent of the parties controls to find husband and wife are the parents); Hodas
v. Morin, 814 N.E.2d 320 (Mass. 2004) (genetic/intended parents sued for pre-birth
judgment of parentage for child born to gestational carrier; court had jurisdiction even
though all parties resided outside Massachusetts, because gestational agreement stipulated
that birth would take place at a Massachusetts hospital); Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess
Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133 (Mass. 2001) (genetic mother and father of child born to
gestational carrier sued hospital to list them on birth certificate as parents in pre-birth
order); T.V. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 2010 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1378 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.Jan. 15,
2010) (husband and wife, the genetic parents of the child implanted in a gestational carrier,
filed an uncontested action to name the intended parents-and not gestational carrier and
her husband-as parents on birth certificate; the court refused to grant relief, noting that
"an alternate remedy exists in the form of an expedited adoption which, notably, was
capable of being completed far more expeditiously than this action"), rev'd, 929 N.YS.2d 139
(2011);J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740 (Ohio 2007) (genetic parents, not gestational carrier, are
parents of child); Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54 (Com. Pl. 1994) (intended parents
provided their own sperm and egg for the gestational carrier; asked for declaratory
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an uncontested action to list the wife, not the gestational carrier, as
the mother on the birth certificate. The New York trial court found
it lacked jurisdiction to find maternity because the statute addressed
only paternity, and an alternative remedy-adoption-existed for
the plaintiffs. While the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate
Division, reversed and declared that genetics could be used to es-
tablish that the wife was the mother,'91 the UPA would require the
husband and wife to submit to home visits, among other proce-
dures, in order to adopt their own genetic child. The UPA model
increases the costs of a gestational carrier agreement,92 and may
encourage parents to enter into such agreements in states with
friendlier legislation, or offshore.'93
Ultimately the choice between the UPC's self-enforcing agree-
ment and the UPA's judicial model may depend on one's beliefs on
the position of a gestational carrier. Is a gestational carrier analo-
gous to a woman giving up her child for adoption, in need of
protection from unscrupulous and desperate childless people? Or
is a gestational carrier an autonomous person capable of anticipat-
ing how she will feel when the child is born, and able to contract
away a decision to change her mind? Unlike a typical adoption, the
child of a gestational carrier comes into existence solely because of
the agreement. Given appropriate safeguards as in the UPC, the
gestational carrier should have the freedom to agree, in advance,
that she is not the legal mother of the child.
judgment that they were the parents of the child without the necessity of an adoption
proceeding); JR. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (D. Utah 2002) (husband and wife were
genetic parents of child implanted in gestational carrier; birth certificate named gestational
carrier as mother).
191. TV, 929 N.YS.2d at 151-52.
192. The gestational carrier agreement itself may cost from $68,000 to over $100,000.
For example, the Fertility Institutes of Los Angeles, New York, and New Mexico, "urge you to
compare our complete Surrogacy prices (less than $68,000.00) with other programs costing
over $140,000.00." Surrogacy Solutions, THE FERTILITY INSTITUTES, http://wwW.fertility
-docs.com/surrogates fees.phtml?PHPSESSID=485c31e9e80604fff4fcc9cff6080235 (last visited
February 25, 2012).
193. See, e.g., Margot Cohen, A Search for a Surrogate Leads to India, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9,
2009, at W8; Amelia Gentleman, India Nurtures Business of Surrogate Motherhood, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2008, at A9; Abigail Haworth, Womb For Rent: Surrogate Mothers in India, WEBMD,
http://www.webmd.com/infertility-and-reproduction/features/womb-rent-surrogate-
mothers-india (last visited Feb. 25, 2012) (noting that Indian surrogacy is estimated to be a
$445 million a year business, with fees far lower than in the United States: "Surrogacy costs
about $12,000 in India, including all medical expenses and the surrogate's fee. In the U.S.,
the same procedure can cost up to $70,000."); Mark Magnier, A Bundle ofJoy With Baggage,
L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 19, 2011, at A4.
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CONCLUSION
Thousands of Americans use ART to have children every year.
Many of them are single or in same-sex relationships, while many
state statutes apply only to married heterosexual couples. This vac-
uum of statutory guidance for thousands of ART children and their
parents has two serious consequences, as Professor Robertson has
observed. First, it discriminates against certain kinds of infertility.
Second, "without resort to the courts and the development of laws
to protect the participants, there will be more disputes and prob-
lems than would otherwise occur."9 4 The key question in assisted
reproduction is "not on whether but on how the new technologies
should be used.",19
Adopting either the 2002 UPA or the 2008 amendments to the
UPC would be a vast improvement for most states. Either statute
resolves the issue of how to establish consent to ART, especially af-
ter one partner has died. For states willing to face the reality that
same-sex, unmarried and single people are using ART to have
children, the UPC is the better alternative to deal with these com-
plex issues. The UPC, unlike any version of the UPA, recognizes
that the statutes must include same-sex couples and single parents.
The UPC also recognizes that many people enter into agreements
with gestational carriers despite significant doubts about their en-
forceability. In the area of postmortem conception children, the
UPC provides useful time limits to ensure that estates need not
remain open indefinitely. The main failing of the UPC amend-
ments on PMC children, the presumption of consent for a married
decedent in UPC § 2-120, can be easily resolved by adapting the
presumption of consent from UPC § 2-121, thus requiring that the
decedent deposit gametic material before his or death, and that
the gametic material be actually used in conceiving the PMC child.
194. Robertson, supra note 170, at 262; see also 7 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLIS-ON ON CON-
TRACTS, § 16:22, at 615 (4th ed. 2010) ("Given the fact that the statutes and decisions thus
far have not deterred individuals from entering into these surrogacy arrangements, and the
likelihood that reproductive technology will continue to develop, it seems probable that the
courts have by no means ended their consideration of the many issues surrounding the
relationship.").
195. Robertson, supra note 170, at 261.
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